How Informative Are Interest Rate Survey-based Forecasts? by Mateus A. Feitosa & Benjamin M. Tabak
       
 
Available online at 
http://www.anpad.org.br/bar 
 
BAR, Curitiba, v. 5, n. 4, art. 4, p. 304-318,  
Oct./Dec. 2008 
         
       
How Informative  How Informative  How Informative  How Informative Are  Are  Are  Are Interest  Interest  Interest  Interest Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate Survey Survey Survey Survey- - - -based  based  based  based 
Forecasts? Forecasts? Forecasts? Forecasts?
(1) (1) (1) (1)       
       
       
Mateus A. Feitosa *  
E-mail address: mateus.araujo@uc3m.es 
Universidade Carlos III de Madrid 
Madrid, Spain. 
 
Benjamin M. Tabak  
E-mail address: Benjamin.Tabak@bcb.gov.br 
Banco Central do Brasil; Universidade Católica de Brasília 
Brasília, DF, Brazil. 
 
       
A A A ABSTRACT BSTRACT BSTRACT BSTRACT       
 
This paper studies the information content of survey-based predictions for the Brazilian short-term interest rate. 
We perform vector autoregression analysis to test for the dynamic relationship between market expectations of 
interest rates and spot interest rates, and a single regression forecasting approach.  Empirical results suggest that 
surveys may be useful in assessing market expectations (contain relevant information) and in building Central 
Bank credibility. Within an inflation targeting framework they are crucial in order to receive timely feedback on 
market sentiment regarding the conduct of monetary policy. 
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I I I INTRODUCTION NTRODUCTION NTRODUCTION NTRODUCTION       
       
 
The dynamics of interest rates have important implications for the economy and their forecasts are 
necessary for almost all  economic activities. Participants in the  financial  markets require accurate 
forecasts of interest rates to make economic and financial decisions. These decisions have a heavy 
influence on aggregate-spending, which, in turn, affects real output and inflation. 
In  mid-1999,  after  moving  to  a  floating  exchange  rate  system,  Inflation  Targeting  [IT]  was 
implemented  in  Brazil.  This  new  monetary  framework  proved  to  be  fundamental  in  enhancing 
transparency  and  in  guiding  expectations.  Additionally,  evidence  suggests  a  positive  relationship 
between inflation targets and the credibility of monetary policy
(2).  
Other studies (see Minella, 2003) indicate that the Central Bank of Brazil is concerned exclusively 
with inflation control, thereby avoiding the inflation-output trade-off to enhance short-term production 
in Brazil. This behavior is an important aspect towards the construction of credibility.  
In an IT framework the main goal of the Central Bank is to provide guidance to the economy to 
anchor expectations regarding the future path of inflation. Therefore, it is crucial to assess market 
expectations in a timely fashion and check whether they are in line with the conduct of monetary 
policy.  
With the implementation of the IT regime in Brazil the Central Bank of Brazil began to collect 
information  from  market  participants  using  surveys,  which  provide  information  regarding  market 
expectations on relevant economic and financial variables such as short-term interest rates (SELIC)
(3), 
inflation,  exchange  rates,  GDP  growth,  and  others.  However,  very  little  is  known  regarding  the 
informational content of these survey-based market predictions. If the information content embedded 
in such predictions is relevant and meaningful then these surveys may be used to assess Central Bank 
credibility and eventually to calibrate the conduct of monetary policy.  
In this paper, we study the dynamic relationship of interest rate based-survey forecasts and spot 
interest rates. Our results suggest that these market expectations contain useful information regarding 
the future evolution of interest rates and also that they may be used to gauge Central Bank credibility.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  will  be  structured  as  follows:  in  section  Brief  Literature  Review  a  brief 
literature  review  is  presented;  section  Data  Description  describes  the  data  used  in  our  estimates; 
section Methodology contains the methodology; in section Empirical Results we present the empirical 
results; in section Policy Implications the policy implications are discussed and, finally, section Final 
Considerations concludes. 
       
       
B B B BRIEF  RIEF  RIEF  RIEF L L L LIT IT IT ITERATURE  ERATURE  ERATURE  ERATURE R R R REVIEW EVIEW EVIEW EVIEW       
       
       
The market predictions for the interest rate are an important issue that has been studied for a long 
time, mainly in the case of the United States financial system. The studies analyze many questions, 
such as the directional accuracy of the predictions, the rationality of the forecasts and the quality of the 
methods used to forecast interest rates.     
Friedman (1980) and Baghestani (2006) make an evaluation of the interest rates in the USA and both 
test the rationality of the forecasts. They both arrived at the same conclusion that the forecasts are not 
rational, i.e., they are unbiased and, in some cases, do not fully incorporate the information contained 
in past actual rates. Using Friedman’s sample, Mishkin (1981) also tests the rationality of the forecasts 
and reached the  opposite  conclusion. The author argues that there  is  very  little  evidence  in bond 
market data in support of the irrationality of interest rate forecasts. Jones and Roley (1983) rejected the Mateus A. Feitosa, Benjamin M. Tabak 
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joint hypotheses that forecasters form their expectations rationally and the expectations model of the 
term structure accurately represents equilibrium yields. However, because a joint hypothesis is tested, 
the precise cause of rejection cannot be determined.  
Dua (1991) tests various hypotheses concerning the determinants of the three, six, and nine-month 
horizon term premia. He uses data on the three-month Treasury bill rate from the survey conducted by 
the American Statistical Association in collaboration with the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
His conclusion is that the term premia vary over time and are negative in some periods. They are 
heavily influenced by the level of interest rates and cyclical factors in addition to the level of rates. 
They are also influenced by Government economic policy. 
Hafer, Hein and McDonald (1992) compare four different one-quarter ahead forecasts of the three-
month  U.S.  Treasury-bill  rate  from  the  12-year  period  1977/88.  The  forecasts  considered  are:  a 
prediction from the futures market, a forecast derived from an implicit forward rate calculation, a 
survey-gathered forecast and a no-change forecast. Their main conclusion is that the futures market 
rate statistically dominates the other three forecasts. Another comparison of forecasting methods is 
made  by  Fauvel,  Paquet  and  Zimmermann  (1999),  which  concludes  that  despite  their  apparent 
simplicity, univariate models tend to do pretty well in practice for forecasting purposes. Similarly, 
their  natural  extension  to  a  multivariate  setting  (i.e.  VAR  and  VECM)  constitutes  an  interesting 
approach for an integrated treatment of various interest rates, including both their short-term dynamics 
and any existing long-run relationships. 
Kolb and Stekler (1998) examine three issues: is there a general agreement among analysts about the 
level of interest rates six months in the future; are all the forecasters equally good; are the forecasts 
valuable to prospective users? They conclude that there is a consensus among financial analysts and 
there is no significant difference in the ability of these financial analysts to predict short-term interest 
rates. For the last issue, the conclusion is that the forecasts were not significantly better than random 
walk forecasts.     
Greer (2003) tests the directional accuracy of long-term interest rate forecasts. The tests are applied 
to the 1-year long-term bond yield issued by The Wall Street Journal’s panel of economic forecasters. 
The author affirms that the forecasts performed modestly better than flipping a fair coin to predict the 
direction of change in long-term interest rates. The forecast of movements in long-term interest rates 
were also studied by Pesando (1981), who concluded that economic agents are not likely to succeed in 
forecasting short-term movements in long-term interest rates. 
Following the results found by previous studies, Mitchell and Pearce (2007) concluded that market 
forecasts for the Treasury bill rate had a performance very similar to the random walk model, even 
though they found no evidence that these forecasts are biased.   
Overall, we have a poor understanding of the role of market expectations (implied in surveys) on the 
determination of interest rates. Do forecasts collected in surveys correctly predict changes in future 
interest rates? How do interest rates survey based forecasts interact with spot interest rates? This paper 
attempts to answer these questions by focusing on the Brazilian economy, which has had an inflation-
targeting framework in operation since 1999, and has collected information on market expectations 
employing surveys since 2001. 
       
       
D D D DATA  ATA  ATA  ATA D D D DESCRIPTION ESCRIPTION ESCRIPTION ESCRIPTION       
       
       
Data from Selic and the market forecasts in the one, three and six-month horizon were used in this 
paper. The data consists of the period from November, 2001 to August, 2006. Selic series were taken 
from Bloomberg, and the market predictions series were taken from the Central Bank of Brazil, which How Informative Are Interest Rates Survey-based Forecasts? 
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has been monitoring market consensus for the most important economic variables since 2001. In this 
study, we use average forecasts, and our sample has 57 observations.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the series and it shows that Selic and the forecasts for all 
time horizons reject the null hypothesis of following a normal distribution, despite the low values of 
the skewness. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One,  Three  and  Six  months  are  survey-based  forecasts  for  these  time  periods, 
respectively.    
*,** denote rejection of the null hypothesis with 1% and 5% significance, respectively. 
 
To  test  if  the  series  are  stationary,  we  employ  the  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  [ADF]  and  the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin [KPSS] tests. The results for Selic and the average of the Selic 
forecasts are shown in Table 2 and they indicate that all series are stationary. Consequently, the use of 
a VAR model is the appropriate method to study the dynamic relationship between these series.  
 
Table 2: ADF and KPSS Unit Root Tests Results for the Average of the Predictions 
 
 
 
 
 
** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis with 5% significance. 
¯  The  KPSS  unit  root  test  was  estimated  using  the  Bartlett  Kernel  spectral  estimation 
method. 
º The bandwidth was selected using the Newet-West bandwidth selection. 
 
The relationship between Selic and the three-month horizon forecast is presented in Figure 1. It 
indicates that the movements of the series over time are very similar, and it appears that the forecasts’ 
movements follow Selic’s changes, indicating that there is an asymmetric relationship between the 
series.   
   Selic  One month  Three month  Six month 
 Mean   19.00877   18.68745   18.05655   17.26463 
 Std. Dev.   3.254792   3.046300   2.826462   2.400556 
 Skewness   1.125748   1.148835   1.034043   0.963024 
 Kurtosis   3.426352   3.570575   3.540068   3.486089 
 Jarque-Bera   12.47114*  12.84444*   10.46984*   8.878380** 
  ADF    KPSS¯   
  # of lags  test statistics    Bandwidthº  LM-stat   
SELIC  2  -3.985**    6  0.2883   
One-month  4  -3.732**    5  0.247467   
Three-months  4  -3.967**    5  0.211648   
Six-months  4  -3.854**    5  0.182617   Mateus A. Feitosa, Benjamin M. Tabak 
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Figure 1: Relationship between Selic and the Three-month-ahead Forecast 
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M M M METHODOLOGY ETHODOLOGY ETHODOLOGY ETHODOLOGY       
       
       
Multivariate Approach Multivariate Approach Multivariate Approach Multivariate Approach       
       
The use of a VAR model is a suggestive option, considering that, while the late past cannot perfectly 
predict future values, it does provide valuable guidance. Furthermore, VAR models have proved to be 
very useful tools in forecast methods
(4). Consequently we treat each variable symmetrically, and we 
also consider both endogenous. The VAR model used was:   
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(2) 
where Forec are the survey-based forecasts for the Selic interest rate, p is the lag length used in the 
model, and ε1 and ε2 correspond to the errors of each equation, respectively. This approach is similar to 
the one followed by Mehra (2002), who tested for the US the predictive content of inflation survey-
based forecasts. 
To determine the appropriate lag length, the Schwarz Information Criterion [SIC] was employed. 
The  SIC,  rather  than  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion,  was  selected  because  it  imposes  a  larger 
penalty for additional coefficients. In the estimation of the VAR model, the SIC suggested 2 lags as 
the optimal number of lags for the one and three-month-ahead forecasts, and 4 lags for the six-month-
ahead forecast. Residual tests were employed with the purpose of verifying serial autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity.  
       How Informative Are Interest Rates Survey-based Forecasts? 
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Univariate Approach Univariate Approach Univariate Approach Univariate Approach       
       
In the previous subsection we presented the framework that will be employed to study the dynamic 
relationship between spot interest rates and survey-based forecasts. We also test for the informational 
content of survey-based forecasts in a single regression approach. 
The regression equation that is employed is: 
t j t t j t Forec Selic ε β α + + = + + ,   (3) 
where  j t Selic +  is realized Selic at time t + j, and  j t t Forec + ,  is the forecast made at time t for period 
t + j. Rational forecasts would  imply α = 0 and β  = 1. If α differs from zero then  we  have risk 
premiums embedded in survey-based forecasts, and if β differs from one forecasts are biased. Values 
for β larger than one imply that forecasts tend to underestimate true realizations of short-term interest 
rates, while β less than one overestimate. 
Since we are using monthly observations and we have three and six–month forecasts, the residuals 
of  these  predictions  will  have  moving  average  (MA)  terms,  MA(2)  and  MA(5),  respectively. 
Therefore, we employ the Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors to make inference on 
parameters α and β.      
       
       
E E E EMPIRICAL  MPIRICAL  MPIRICAL  MPIRICAL R R R RESULTS ESULTS ESULTS ESULTS       
       
       
Multivariate  Multivariate  Multivariate  Multivariate A A A Approach pproach pproach pproach       
       
In  this  section,  results  for  the  VAR  estimation  are  presented.  Table  3  shows  results  for  VAR 
estimation  for  different  time  horizons.  These  results  report  that  all  the  coefficients  estimated  are 
significant at 5% or 10% significance. The only exception is in the six-month horizon, where the 
lagged values of the forecasts (t-2, t-3 and t-4) are not significant in the determination of Selic. It is 
important to note that the high values of the adjusted R
2 indicate that the model is well specified. Mateus A. Feitosa, Benjamin M. Tabak 
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Table 3: Var Results of the Relationship between Selic and the Survey-based Predictions 
 
** and *** indicate the significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
The number of lags was selected using The Schwarz information criterion. 
LM  indicates  the  lagrangian  multiplier  test,  JB  the  Jarque-Bera  statistics  and  White  the  White 
Heteroscedasticity test. 
In the LM test it was used 3, 3 and 5 lags, respectively. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the LM test did not reject the null hypothesis that there is no serial 
autocorrelation for all time horizons. Additionally, there is a lack of heteroscedasticity, based on the 
White  test  and  the  Jarque-Bera  test  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  data  follow  a  normal 
distribution. 
The variance decomposition results are reported in Table 4 for all the time ranges, and they indicate 
that Selic explains a major part of its error variance. For the relationship between Selic and the one-
month-ahead forecast, Selic explains near 100% of its error variance. On the other hand, the forecasts 
are extremely affected by Selic. The forecast error variance is, in the first periods, explained by its 
own past values, but as the period increases, forecast error variance is mostly explained by Selic.  
   one-month  three-month  six-month 
  Selic   Forec  Selic   Forec  Selic   Forec 
Selic(-1)  1.176694**  0.876593**  1.189792**  0.748432**  1.258175**  0.644587** 
Selic (-2)  -0.320861***  -0.612198**  -0.331082**  -0.610565**  -0.17009  -0.763836** 
Selic (-3)          -0.647282**  0.288238** 
Selic(-4)          0.378047**  -0.044768 
Forec (-1)  0.610844**  0.941781**  0.615958**  1.072779**  0.549878**  1.354043** 
Forec (-2)  -0.534659**  -0.270082**  -0.531109**  -0.305245**  -0.257585  -0.768462** 
Forec (-3)          -0.04106  0.379797** 
Forec (-4)          -0.058486  -0.214714** 
C  1.332864**  1.063379**  1.190559**  1.580588**  0.170493  1.929080** 
 Adj. R-squared   0.962725   0.992014   0.962771   0.988609   0.966253   0.987012 
 F-statistic   323.8462   1553.782   311.3272   1042.440   165.6355   437.9623 
 Log likelihood  -46.09380  -3.828627  -44.16371  -7.952474  -38.10895  -1.641102 
 Akaike AIC   2.003678   0.346221   2.006682   0.528672   2.004636   0.452813 
 Schwarz SC   2.193073   0.535615   2.199725   0.721715   2.358920   0.807096 
Test  Value  p-value  Value  p-value  Value  p-value 
LM   7.206499   0.1254   5.713072   0.2216   6.200176   0.1847 
JB   206.5881  0.0000   207.2309  0.0000   102.6337  0.0000 
White   32.15931   0.1231   26.77530  0.3150   47.50373  0.4931 How Informative Are Interest Rates Survey-based Forecasts? 
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Table 4: Variance Decomposition of Selic and the Average of the One, Three and Six-month 
Horizon Forecasts (Survey-based) 
 
 
For the factorization the Cholesky Decomposition was used.  
The number of lags used in the VAR were selected using the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
 
Granger causality tests (Granger, 1996) for Selic and the predictions are shown in Table 5, and they 
indicate that, for shorter time horizons, either the effect of Selic on the survey-based predictions or the 
effect of forecasts on Selic are significant. Thus, causality is bidirectional: Selic affects the forecasts, 
and vice-versa. These findings are consistent with the conventional wisdom that the short-term interest 
rate values in the late past have a big influence on the predictions of the market, and the Central Bank 
is influenced by several variables, including market predictions on the determination of short-term 
interest rates. For a longer time horizon (six months), the Granger Causality test suggests that the 
causality is unidirectional: Selic affects the forecasts, but not the reverse.  
Variance decomposition of Selic             
Period  one-month forecast  three-month forecast  six-month forecast 
  Selic  Forecast  Selic  Forecast  Selic  Forecast 
1  100.0000  0.000000  100.0000  0.000000  100.0000  0.000000 
2  97.88526  2.114744  97.02771  2.972294  97.72751  2.272490 
3  97.49213  2.507874  95.76706  4.232945  94.59899  5.401013 
4  97.24237  2.757635  94.89667  5.103331  90.42064  9.579364 
5  97.26540  2.734595  94.49381  5.506192  87.51658  12.48342 
6  97.36897  2.631026  94.33431  5.665688  85.06424  14.93576 
7  97.51137  2.488625  94.32987  5.670127  83.82439  16.17561 
8  97.65158  2.348421  94.40755  5.592449  83.09674  16.90326 
9  97.76728  2.232722  94.51469  5.485306  82.93300  17.06700 
10  97.84178  2.158224  94.60621  5.393790  82.92325  17.07675 
11  97.86543  2.134567  94.64544  5.354561  83.01840  16.98160 
12  97.83729  2.162711  94.60999  5.390012  83.05480  16.94520 
13  97.76706  2.232942  94.49944  5.500564  82.97965  17.02035 
14  97.67378  2.326216  94.33670  5.663300  82.77030  17.22970 
15  97.58003  2.419974  94.15850  5.841500  82.43520  17.56480 
Variance decomposition of forecasts             
Period  one-month forecast  three-months forecast  six-months forecast 
1  18.87834  81.12166  7.483230  92.51677  2.514133  97.48587 
2  79.75540  20.24460  63.99316  36.00684  48.80950  51.19050 
3  86.87736  13.12264  74.49516  25.50484  61.59084  38.40916 
4  90.56222  9.437778  79.88502  20.11498  68.85500  31.14500 
5  92.41356  7.586439  82.71250  17.28750  70.75269  29.24731 
6  93.57836  6.421640  84.46104  15.53896  72.22286  27.77714 
7  94.33701  5.662986  85.58020  14.41980  72.72544  27.27456 
8  94.84457  5.155428  86.29651  13.70349  73.18133  26.81867 
9  95.16832  4.831683  86.71879  13.28121  73.43126  26.56874 
10  95.34752  4.652485  86.91574  13.08426  73.66186  26.33814 
11  95.41011  4.589891  86.94824  13.05176  73.73705  26.26295 
12  95.38556  4.614444  86.88646  13.11354  73.67107  26.32893 
13  95.30957  4.690431  86.80633  13.19367  73.49611  26.50389 
14  95.22098  4.779024  86.76953  13.23047  73.25932  26.74068 
15  95.15249  4.847509  86.80432  13.19568  73.06519  26.93481 Mateus A. Feitosa, Benjamin M. Tabak 
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Table 5: Granger Causality Test among Selic and the Average of the One, Three and Six-month 
Horizon Forecasts 
 
   χ
2  p-value 
Selic  → /  One-month Forecast  14.78221  0.0006 
One-month forecast → /  Selic  170.9895  0.0000 
     
Selic → / three-month forecast  14.33598  0.0008 
Three-month forecast → / Selic  111.6262  0.0000 
     
Selic → / six-month forecast  5.236671  0.2639 
Six-months forecast → / Selic  82.02120  0.0000 
Where the symbol → /  stands for Does not Granger-cause.   
       
Univariate Regressions Univariate Regressions Univariate Regressions Univariate Regressions       
       
The results for the regression (equation 3) are reported in Table 6. The market would have a perfect 
prediction of Selic if the value of the α parameter were zero, and the value of the β parameter were 
equal to one. It is interesting to note that the time range has a non neglectable influence over the 
estimations.  The  one-month-ahead  forecast  is  very  precise  (β  =  1.009),  and  as  the  time  horizon 
increases,  both  the  overestimation  and  the  premium  term  increase.  Additionally,  in  the  six-month 
horizon forecasts, the joint hypothesis α=0 and β=1 is rejected with 5% significance, indicating that 
the market predictions perform poorly for this time horizon. The results also indicate that, for the three 
and six-month ahead forecast, the market tends to overestimate Selic’s changes. 
 
Table 6: Relationship between Selic and the Average of the One, Three and Six-month Horizon 
Forecasts 
 
Forecast  α  β  Adj R
2  Η0: α=0  Η0:β=1  Η0:α=0 and β=1 
One-month  0.190895  1.009666*  0.875161  0.024678  0.017079  3.462648 
  (1.215181)  (0.073964)    [0.8752]  [0.8960]  [0.1770] 
Three-month  2.805520  0.892932*  0.541853  0.923509  0.381726  4.849035*** 
  (2.919394)  (0.173295)    [0.3366]  [0.5367]  [0.0885] 
Six-month  11.77720**  0.415430  0.062121  6.351435**  4.729635**  9.056505** 
  (4.673113)  (0.268796)    [0.0117]  [0.0296]  [0.0108] 
* ** *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis with 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
' Standard errors are provided in parentheses and p-values in brackets. 
" The Newey-West correction for serial correlation was used in the tests 
 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the adjusted R
2 estimated in regressions between the one-month-
ahead forecast and Selic. In this case we estimate regression (3) recursively. The regression initially 
estimated possesses observations from December, 2001 to April, 2004; this means that half of the 
observations available  were used  in this first regression. In  each regression further  estimated, one 
observation was added. This process was repeated until all the 57 observations were present. Figure 2 
indicates that the adjusted R
2 has a smooth increase over time. The same figure was plotted for the 
regression between Selic and the three and six-month-ahead forecast, and the graphs are very similar 
to the one obtained for the one-month-ahead forecast. 
 How Informative Are Interest Rates Survey-based Forecasts? 
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Figure 2: Adjusted R-squared Evolution 
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The R
2 variation was calculated
(5) in order to compare how the predictable portion of Selic varies as 
the number of observations increase. The results found for the one, three and six-month horizon were, 
respectively, 7.1%, 44.7% and 999.19%, indicating that the poor performance of longer time horizon 
forecasts may be due to lack of a longer time series.  
We also estimate equation (3) using the Generalized Method of Moments [GMM], where it was used 
as an instrument the survey based predictions in the t-1 period. The results reported in table 7 indicate 
that there is a small qualitative difference between the results found using the OLS and the GMM. The 
results indicate that the market overestimates Selic in all time horizons, and not only in the 3 and 6-
month-ahead. Additionally, the term premium is more expressive using the GMM. For the 6-month-
ahead forecast, the null hypothesis α=0 and β=1 is rejected with 1% significance. 
It is interesting to note that, despite the difference among the results, the adjusted R
2 have very 
similar values, mainly in the shorter time horizons. Finally, the J-statistic reports that the parameters 
used in the regression are well specified. 
 
Table 7: Estimation Results Using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
 
Forecast  α  β  Adj R
2  Η0: α=0  Η0:β=1  Η0:α=0 and β=1  J-stat 
One month  1.595732  0.935450*  0.867663  1.473021  0.755600  4.257107  5.78E-31 
  (1.314787)  (0.074259)    [0.2249]  [0.3847]  [0.1190]   
Three–month  5.933554  0.723968*  0.515871  3.741862***  2.517047  6.755358**  1.45E-31 
  (3.067404)  (0.173986)    [0.0531]  [0.1126]  [0.0341]   
Six-month  16.06075*  0.171007  0.033745  12.66100*  11.21977*  13.19353*  6.91E-30 
  (4.513689)  (0.247491)    [0.0004]  [0.0008]  [0.0014]   
* ** *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis with 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. 
The forecast in period t-1 was used as an instrument. 
       
Forecast Comparison Forecast Comparison Forecast Comparison Forecast Comparison       
       
We  compared  the  forecasting  accuracy  of  survey-based  expectations  of  Selic  interest  rates  with 
econometric models and a Random Walk [RW] model.  
The econometric models used are AR (1), where 120 observations were available and in order to 
determine the sample, two methods were used: the moving window method and the recursive. The 
moving window approach is one that bases its estimates on the most recent set of past measurements. Mateus A. Feitosa, Benjamin M. Tabak 
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As a new measurement is taken in, the oldest measurement of the set is dropped. In the recursive 
method, each new measurement available is added and none is dropped, which results in a larger 
sample as time goes by.     
To compare the forecasting accuracy, we used the Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic, which is 
given by: 
) 1 , 0 ( ~ N
d
DM
d σ
=  
(4) 
Where d  is the sample mean loss differential, which is based on the Mean Squared Errors [MSE] of 
the forecasts, and  d σ  is the variance of the loss differential. The results found are presented in Table 
8, and they indicate that the survey-based forecasts perform better than random walk models in all 
time horizons, while the AR model using the recursive approach performs better than the surveys in 
longer time horizons. With the moving window approach, the AR performs better in all time horizons. 
It is worth noting that the time horizon has an important impact on the comparison between these two 
forecasts.  
 
Table 8: Out-of-Sample Forecasts Comparison 
 
MSE Ratio 
   AR - moving window  AR - recursive  RW 
1-month  1,002709319  0,400481725  0,02491731 
3-month  3,645300388  1,495564424  0,097222895 
6-month  9,635843182  3,944697163  0,26349346 
Diebold-Mariano Statistics 
   AR - moving window  AR - recursive  RW 
1-month  -0,01  3.38*  9.41* 
3-month  -1,33  -0,55  3.70* 
6-month  -1.83**  -1,40  1.89** 
This  table  presents  the  ratio  of  out-of-sample  survey  forecasts  to  econometric  and 
random walk models. 
The second part presents Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistics for the comparison of 
forecasts. 
* and ** stand for rejection of the null hypothesis that the MSE are equal at 1% and 
10% respectively. 
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One of the problems of the IT regime is that an evaluation of monetary policy cannot be easily done 
due to a lag response of inflation to changes in monetary policy. It implies that an analysis of whether 
inflation is on track cannot be done using realized inflation. This lack of perception affects not only 
the  Central  Bank,  but  also  the  public  and  the  financial  markets,  which  may  lead  to  adverse 
consequences for the Central Bank’s credibility.      
Bernanke  and  Woodford  (1997,  p.  4)  present  an  alternative  approach  to  a  monetary  policy 
evaluation: “an interesting possibility is for the Central Bank to target current forecasts of medium-
term inflation, rather than inflation itself”. They also argue “the Central Bank may well be able to infer 
useful information from private-sector forecasts other than inflation, such as output or interest rates” 
(p. 5). How Informative Are Interest Rates Survey-based Forecasts? 
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Amato  and  Laubach  (2000)  suggest  that  forecasts  of  goal  variables,  such  as  interest  rates  and 
inflation, can help central banks achieve their goals and make them more accountable to the public. 
They defend the point of view that forecasts are valuable tools to evaluate monetary policy because of 
the lag response of goal variables to monetary policy.  
Another important reason to follow market expectations is the possibility of inflation scare, i.e., 
unusual  increases  in  inflation  expectations,  where  macroeconomic  stabilization  can  be  affected. 
Orphanides and Williams (2005) affirm that it is essential to anchor private inflation expectations for 
successful monetary policy. They conclude that learning-induced inflation expectations perform an 
important role on financial stability. 
This paper shows that the  market forecasts for Brazilian short-term  interest rates are a valuable 
referential of whether monetary policy is been correctly conducted. The results state that, mainly in 
short time horizons, market forecasts are very accurate. Additionally, the Granger causality test reports 
that market expectations are strongly affected by Selic in all time horizons, suggesting that monetary 
policy has a strong influence over market expectations. These results support the idea that forecasts 
can be used as a tool for an evaluation of the Central Bank’s policy.  
This  influence of  monetary policy  over survey-base  forecasts  may be  due to an  increase  in the 
Central Bank’s credibility. This credibility composes the base of the IT regime.  
A central bank is credible if the public believes that the monetary authority will do what it says. For 
the  establishment  of  credibility,  the  transparency  of  monetary  policy  actions  is  fundamental.  As 
reported by Lyziak, Mackiewicz and Stanislawska (2007, p. 2), “transparency is a multidimensional 
phenomenon, which involves not only the issue of the Central Bank releasing adequate information in 
terms of its quantity and quality, but also a correct interpretation of the released information by the 
public”. To this end, guiding correct signals back to the financial market can prevent currency crises
(6).  
Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner and Zha (2006) indicate that since the Federal Open Market Committee 
[FOMC] began releasing statements after each meeting, forecasts by individuals have become more 
synchronized, implying a possible increase in FOMC transparency.    
Analyzing the specific case of Turkey, Telatar, Telatar and Ratti (2003) and Us (2004) conclude a 
stronger commitment by the Government and Central Bank with gain of credibility in order to reduce 
inflation is fundamental.    
In  1999,  Brazil  adopted  the  Inflation-Targeting  [IT]  framework.  In  this  case,  the  success  of  IT 
depends on the construction of credibility. Private agents should believe that the central bank will act 
consistently within the inflation-targeting framework. Tabak (2004) reports that the implementation of 
the IT framework in Brazil enhanced transparency of the conduct of monetary policy, which in its 
turn, reduced interest rate surprises along the term structure.  
This subject was also studied by Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn and Muinhos (2003). In their paper they 
analyzed the first three and a half years of the IT system in Brazil. Their results show that the inflation 
targets have worked as an important coordinator of expectations, the Central Bank has reacted strongly 
to inflation expectations and that there has been a reduction in the degree of inflation persistence. They 
conclude that the presence of a central bank committed to the achievement of pre-announced inflation 
targets has worked as an important coordinator of expectations and generated a more stable inflation 
scenario. 
Bevilacqua, Mesquita and Minella (2007) found evidence that the backward-looking component of 
market expectations has been ceding ground to the inflation target, evidence that this regime is gaining 
credibility.  They  also  affirm  that  the  improvement  in  macroeconomic  fundamentals  played  an 
important role in the creation of a more predictable environment. 
In  this  paper  the  variance  decompositions  results  reported  that,  for  all  time  ranges,  there  is  a 
preponderance of Selic’s lagged values over the variance decomposition of market expectations, while Mateus A. Feitosa, Benjamin M. Tabak 
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the opposite is not verified. These findings suggest that the lack of influence of the market over the 
Central Bank’s decisions can be interpreted as a credible monetary policy adopted in Brazil.  
Thus,  we  can  conclude  that  the  IT  framework  adopted  in  Brazil  heavily  influenced  control  of 
inflation,  and  the  mechanisms  used  to  make  the  Central  Bank’s  actions  credible  were  well 
comprehended and absorbed by the public.  
 
       
F F F FINAL  INAL  INAL  INAL C C C CONSIDERATIONS ONSIDERATIONS ONSIDERATIONS ONSIDERATIONS       
       
 
This  paper  analyzes  the  market  predictions  for  the  Brazilian  short-term  interest  rate.  For  this 
purpose, we used a VAR model between Selic and the survey-based predictions in the one, three and 
six-month  horizon,  and  regressions  among  the  predictions  and  Selic  were  estimated.  We  utilized 
predictions of different time horizons to determine whether time has influence over the predictions or 
not. 
Returning to the questions initially formulated, we can conclude that the interaction between Selic 
and the forecasts vary over time. For shorter time horizons, there is a mutual influence among the 
series: the Central Bank takes the market’s forecasts into consideration, and the market is strongly 
influenced by Selic. For a longer time horizon, the influence of Selic over the market is still strong, but 
the role of the market’s predictions on the decisions of the Central Bank decreases.  
The high influence of Selic over market forecasts indicates that market agents seem to take the 
Central Bank’s reports into consideration. This result suggests that forecasts for Brazilian short-term 
interest  rates  can  be  used  as  a  tool  for  an  evaluation  of  monetary  policy.  The  important  role  of 
forecasts  on  monetary  policy  may  be  due  to  increased  Central  Bank  credibility,  that  since  the 
implementation of the IT regime in Brazil, in 1999, it has adopted a transparent policy, aiming to 
reduce the market’s doubts concerning monetary policy.  
When  analyzing  the  accuracy  of  the  survey-based  predictions,  we  can  affirm  that  for  all  time 
horizons  the  market  predicts  correctly  the  direction  of  changes  of  Selic,  but  these  forecasts  are 
accurate  only  in  short  time  intervals.  For  the  longer  time  horizon  studied  (6  months),  the  joint 
hypothesis that the term premium (α) is equal to zero and the parameter β is equal to one is rejected 
with 5% significance. Thus, we can conclude that the predictions tend to get less precise as the time 
range increases. 
An interesting extension of this paper would be to analyze how the IT regime affects the markets’ 
predictions for other variables, such as GDP and the price index. Thus, the credibility of monetary 
policy would be tested in an expanded structure. 
Another  useful  future  research  is  to  investigate  the  role  of  macroeconomic  variables,  including 
output growth and money growth, on the determination of the short-term interest rate. 
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1 Benjamin M. Tabak gratefully acknowledges financial support from CNPQ Foundation. The opinions expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Central Bank of Brazil. 
2 See Bogdanski, J., Tombini, A. A., & Werlang, S. R. C. (2000). Implementing inflation targeting in Brazil [Working Paper 
Series 1]. Central Bank of Brazil. Brasilia, DF, Brasil., and Fachada, P. (2001). Inflation targeting in Brazil: reviewing two 
years of monetary policy [Working Paper Series 25]. Central Bank of Brazil. Brasilia, DF, Brasil, for a discussion about 
inflation targeting in Brazil. How Informative Are Interest Rates Survey-based Forecasts? 
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3  In Brazil, the short-term interest rate, Selic, is determined by the Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM). Selic is the 
Brazilian shot-term interest rate because it is used in inter-bank operations and, therefore, determines the whole spectrum of 
long-term interest rates. Inasmuch, Selic is considered a floor for the interests paid by banks in the deposits, and, based on it, 
banks decide how much they will charge in loans for companies and individuals. Selic is a system for custody issued by the 
Brazilian Treasury and the Central Bank. By means of this system, the monetary authorities set the interest rate for secondary 
market benchmark.
 
4 See Lo, W-C., Fung, H-G., & Morse, J. N. (1995). A note on Euroyen and domestic yen interest rates. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 19(7), 1309-1321, Webb, R. H. (1984). Vector autoregression as a tool for forecast evaluation. Economic 
Review, (Q I), 3-11, Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. (2001). Vector autoregressions. The Journal of Economic Perspective, 
15(4), 101-115,  and Engsted, T. (1995). Does the long-term interest rate predict future inflation? A multi-country analysis. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(1), 42-54 for examples of the use of VAR models in forecasts. 
5 The equation 
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6 See Lam, M. C-H. (2001). Herd behaviour and interest rate defence. Journal of Policy Modeling, 24(2), 181-193 for an 
analysis of government policies to the prevention of crises.  
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